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Abstract
Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for
maximizing the utility of limited defense resources
to protect important targets from an intelligent ad-
versary. Motivated by green security, where the de-
fender may only observe an adversary’s response
to defense on a limited set of targets, we study the
problem of defending against the same adversary
on a larger set of targets from the same distribution.
We give a theoretical justification for why standard
two-stage learning approaches, where a model of
the adversary is trained for predictive accuracy and
then optimized against, may fail to maximize the
defender’s expected utility in this setting. We de-
velop a decision-focused learning approach, where
the adversary behavior model is optimized for de-
cision quality, and show empirically that it achieves
higher defender expected utility than the two-stage
approach when there is limited training data and a
large number of target features.
1 Introduction
Many real-world settings call for allocating limited defender
resources against a strategic adversary, such as protecting
public infrastructure [Tambe, 2011], transportation networks
[Okamoto et al., 2012], large public events [Yin et al., 2014],
urban crime [Zhang et al., 2015], and green security [Fang et
al., 2015]. Stackelberg security games (SSGs) are a critical
framework for computing defender strategies that maximize
expected defender utility to protect important targets from an
intelligent adversary [Tambe, 2011].
In many SSG settings, the adversary’s utility function is
not known a priori. In domains where there are many inter-
actions with the adversary, the history of interactions can be
leveraged to construct an adversary behavior model: a map-
ping from target features to values [Kar et al., 2016]. An ex-
ample of such a domain is protecting wildlife from poaching
[Fang et al., 2015]. The adversary’s behavior is observable
because snares are left behind, which rangers aim to remove
(Fig. 1). Various features such as animal counts, distance to
the edge of the park, weather and time of day may affect how
attractive a particular target is to the adversary.
Figure 1: Snares removed
by rangers in Srepok Na-
tional Park, Cambodia.
We focus on the problem of
learning adversary models that
generalize well: the training
data consists of adversary be-
havior in the context of particu-
lar sets of targets, and we wish
to achieve a high defender util-
ity in the situation where we
are playing against the same
adversary and new sets of tar-
gets. In problem of poach-
ing prevention, rangers patrol a
small portion of the park each day and aim to predict poacher
behavior across a large park consisting of targets with novel
feature values [Gholami et al., 2018].
The standard approach to this problem [Nguyen et al.,
2013; Yang et al., 2011; Kar et al., 2016] breaks the problem
into two stages. In the first, the adversary model is fit to the
historical data using a standard machine learning loss func-
tion, such as mean squared error. In the second, the defender
optimizes her allocation of defense resources against the
model of adversary behavior learned in the first stage. Exten-
sive research has focused on the first, predictive stage: devel-
oping better models of human behavior [Cui and John, 2014;
Abbasi et al., 2016]. We show that models that provide bet-
ter predictions may not improve the defender’s true objective:
higher expected utility. This was observed previously by Ford
et al. [2015] in the context of network security games, moti-
vating our approach.
We propose a decision-focused approach to adversary
modeling in SSGs which directly trains the predictive model
to maximize defender expected utility on the historical data.
Our approach builds on a recently proposed framework (out-
side of security games) called decision-focused learning,
which aims to optimize the quality of the decisions induced
by the predictive model, instead of focusing solely on predic-
tive accuracy [Wilder et al., 2019]; Fig. 2 illustrates our ap-
proach vs. a standard two-stage method. The main idea is to
integrate a solver for the defender’s equilibrium strategy into
the loop of machine learning training and update the model
to improve the decisions output by the solver.
While decision-focused learning has recently been ex-
plored in other domains (see related work), we overcome two
main challenges to extend it to SSGs. First, the defender op-
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Figure 2: Comparison between a standard two-stage approach to training an adversary model and our decision-focused approach.
timization problem is typically nonconvex, whereas previous
work has focused on convex problems. Second, decision-
focused learning requires counterfactual data—we need to
know what our decision outcome quality would have been,
had we taken a different action than the one observed in train-
ing. By contrast, in SSGs we typically only observe the at-
tacker’s response to a fixed historical mixed strategy.
In summary, our contributions are: First, we provide a
theoretical justification for why decision-focused approaches
can outperform two-stage approaches in SSGs. Second, we
develop a decision-focused learning approach to adversary
modeling in SSGs, showing both how to differentiate through
general nonconvex problems as well as estimate counterfac-
tual utilities for subjective utility quantal response [Nguyen
et al., 2013] and related adversary models. Third, we test our
approach on a combination of synthetic and human subject
data and show that decision-focused learning outperforms a
two-stage approach in many settings.
Related Work. There is a rich literature on SSGs, rang-
ing from information revelation [Korzhyk et al., 2011; Guo
et al., 2017] to extensive-form models [Cermak et al., 2016]
to patrolling on graphs [Basilico et al., 2012; Basilico et al.,
2017]. Adversary modeling in particular has been a sub-
ject of extensive study. Yang et al. [2011] show that mod-
eling the adversary with quantal response (QR) results in
more accurate attack predictions. Nguyen et al. [2013] de-
velops subjective utility quantal response (SUQR), which is
more accurate than QR. SUQR is the basis of other models
such as SHARP [Kar et al., 2016]. We focus on SUQR in
our experiments because it is a relatively simple and widely
used approach. Our decision-focused approach extends to
other models that decompose the attacker’s behavior into the
impact of coverage and target value. Sinha et al. [2016]
and Haghtalab et al. [2016] study the sample complexity
(i.e., the number of attacks required) of learning an adver-
sary model. Our setting differs from theirs because their
defender observes attacks on the same target set that their
defense performance is evaluated on. Ling et al. [2018;
2019] use a differentiable QR equilibrium solver to recon-
struct the payoffs of both players from play. This differs from
our objective of maximizing the defender’s expected utility.
Outside of SSGs, Hartford et al. [2016] and Wright and
Leyton-Brown [2017] study the problem of predicting play
in unseen games assuming that all payoffs are fully observ-
able; in our case, the defender seeks to maximize expected
utility and does not observe the attacker’s payoffs. Hartford
et al. [2016] is the only other work to apply deep learning to
modeling boundedly rational players in games.
Wilder et al. [2019] and Donti et al. [2017] study decision-
focused learning for discrete and convex optimization, re-
spectively. Donti et al. use sequential quadratic programming
to solve a convex non-quadratic objective and use the last pro-
gram to calculate derivatives. Here we propose an approach
that works for the broader family of nonconvex functions.
2 Setting
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs). Our focus is on op-
timizing defender strategies for SSGs, which describe the
problem of protecting a set of targets given limited de-
fense resources and constraints on how the resources may
be deployed [Tambe, 2011]. Formally, an SSG is a tuple
{T ,ud,ua, Cd}, where T is a set of targets, ud ≤ 0 is the de-
fender’s payoff if each target is successfully attacked, ua ≥ 0
is the attacker’s, andCd is the set of constraints the defender’s
strategy must satisfy. Both players receive a payoff of zero
when the attacker attacks a target that is defended.
The game proceeds in two stages: the defender computes a
mixed strategy that satisfies the constraintsCd, which induces
a marginal coverage probability (or coverage) p = {pi : i ∈
T }. The attacker’s attack function q determines which target
is attacked, inducing an attack probability for each target. The
defender seeks to maximize her expected utility:
max
p satisfying Cd
DEU(p; q) = (1)
max
p satisfying Cd
∑
i∈T
(1− pi)qi(ua,p)ud(i).
The attacker’s q function can represent a rational attacker,
e.g., qi(p,ua) = 1 if i = argmaxj∈T (1 − pj)ua(j) else 0,
or a boundedly rational attacker. A QR attacker [McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1995] attacks each target with probability pro-
portional to the exponential of its payoff scaled by a constant
λ, i.e., qi(p) ∝ exp(λ(1 − pi)ua). An SUQR [Nguyen et
al., 2013] attacker attacks each target with probability pro-
portional to the exponential of an attractiveness function:
qi(p,y) ∝ exp(wpi + φ(yi)), (2)
where yi is a vector of features of target i and w < 0 is a
constant. We call φ the target value function.
Learning in SSGs. We consider the problem of learning
to play against an attacker with an unknown attack function
q. We observe attacks made by the adversary against sets of
targets with differing features, and our goal is to generalize to
new sets of targets with unseen feature values.
Formally, let 〈q, Cd, Dtrain, Dtest〉 be an instance of a Stack-
elberg security game with latent attack function (SSG-LA).
q, which is not observed by the defender, is the true map-
ping from the features and coverage of each target to the
probability that the attacker will attack that target. Cd is
the set of constraints that a mixed strategy defense must sat-
isfy for the defender. Dtrain are training games of the form
〈T ,y,A,ud,phistorical〉, where T is the set of targets, and y,
A, ud and phistorical are the features, observed attacks, de-
fender’s utility function, and historical coverage probabili-
ties, respectively, for each target i ∈ T . Dtest are test games
〈T ,y,ud〉, each containing a set of targets and the associ-
ated features and defender values for each target. We assume
that all games are drawn i.i.d. from the same distribution. In
a green security setting, the training games represent the re-
sults of patrols on limited areas of the park and the test games
represent the entire park.
The defender’s goal is to select a coverage function x that
takes the parameters of each test game as input and maxi-
mizes her expected utility across the test games against the
attacker’s true q:
max
x satisfying Cd
E
〈T ,y,ud〉∼Dtest
[DEU(x(T ,y,ud); q)] . (3)
To achieve this, she can observe the attacker’s behavior in the
training data and learn how he values different combinations
of features. We now explore two approaches to the learning
problem: the standard two-stage approach taken by previous
work and our proposed decision-focused approach.
Two-Stage Approach. A standard two-stage approach to
the defender’s problem is to estimate the attacker’s q func-
tion from the training data and optimize against the estimate
during testing. This process resembles multiclass classifica-
tion where the targets are the classes: the inputs are the target
features and historical coverages, and the output is a distribu-
tion over the predicted attack. Specifically, the defender fits
a function qˆ to the training data that minimizes a loss func-
tion. Using the cross entropy, the loss for a particular training
example is
L(qˆ(y,phistorical),A) = −
∑
i∈T
q˜ log(qˆi(y,phistorical)), (4)
where q˜ = Ai|A| is the empirical attack distribution and Ai is
the number of historical attacks that were observed on target
i. Note that we use hats to indicate model outputs and tildes
to indicate the ground truth. For each test game 〈T ,y,ud〉,
coverage is selected by maximizing the defender’s expected
utility assuming the attack function is qˆ:
max
x satisfying Cd
DEU(x(T ,y,ud); qˆ). (5)
Decision-Focused Learning. The standard approach may
fall short when the loss function (e.g., cross entropy) does not
align with the true goal of maximizing expected utility. Ulti-
mately, the defender just wants qˆ to induce the correct mixed
strategy, regardless of how accurate it is in a general sense.
The idea behind our decision-focused learning approach is to
directly train qˆ to maximize defender utility. Define
x∗(qˆ) = argmax
x satisfying Cd
DEU(x; qˆ) (6)
to be the optimal defender coverage function given attack
function qˆ. Ideally, we would find a qˆ which maximizes
DEU(qˆ) = E
〈T ,y,ud〉∼Dtest
[DEU(x∗(qˆ); q)] . (7)
This is just the defender’s expected utility on the test games
when she plans her mixed strategy defense based on attack
function qˆ but the true function is q. While we do not have ac-
cess to Dtest, we can estimate Eq. 7 using samples from Dtrain
(taking the usual precaution of controlling model complexity
to avoid overfitting). The idea behind decision-focused learn-
ing is to directly optimize Eq. 7 on the training data instead
of using an intermediate loss function such as cross entropy.
Minimizing Eq. 7 on the training set via gradient descent re-
quires the gradient, which we can derive using the chain rule:
∂DEU(qˆ)
∂qˆ
= E
〈T ,y,ud〉∼Dtrain
[
∂DEU(x∗(qˆ); q)
∂x∗(qˆ)
∂x∗(qˆ)
∂qˆ
]
.
Here, ∂DEU(x
∗(qˆ);q)
∂x∗(qˆ) describes how the defender’s true util-
ity with respect to q changes as a function of her strategy
x∗. ∂x
∗(qˆ)
∂qˆ describes how x
∗ depends on the estimated attack
function qˆ, which requires differentiating through the opti-
mization problem in Eq. 6. Suppose that we have a means
to calculate both terms. Then we can estimate ∂DEU(qˆ)∂qˆ by
sampling example games from Dtrain and computing gradi-
ents on the samples. If qˆ is itself implemented in a differen-
tiable manner (e.g., a neural network), this allows us to train
the entire system end-to-end via gradient descent. Previous
work has explored decision-focused learning in other con-
texts [Donti et al., 2017; Wilder et al., 2019], but SSGs pose
unique challenges that complicate the process of computing
both of the required terms above. In Sec. 4, we explore these
challenges and propose solutions.
3 Impact of Two-Stage Learning on DEU
We demonstrate that, for natural two-stage training loss func-
tions, decreasing the loss may not lead to increasing the
DEU . This indicates that we may be able to improve deci-
sion quality by making use of decision-focused learning be-
cause a decision-focused approach uses the decision objec-
tive as the loss. Thus, reducing the loss function increases the
DEU in decision-focused learning.
We begin with a simple case: two-target games with a ra-
tional attacker and zero-sum utilities. All proofs are in the
appendix.
Theorem 1. Consider a two-target SSG with a rational at-
tacker, zero-sum utilities, and a single defense resource to al-
locate, which is not subject to scheduling constraints (i.e., any
nonnegative marginal coverage that sums to one is feasible).
Let z0 ≥ z1 be the attacker’s values for the targets, which are
observed by the attacker, but not the defender, and we assume
w.l.o.g. are non-negative and sum to 1.
The defender has an estimate of the attacker’s values
(zˆ0, zˆ1) with mean squared error (MSE) 2. Suppose the
defender optimizes coverage against this estimate. If 2 ≤
(1− z0)2, the ratio between the highest DEU under the esti-
mate of (zˆ0, zˆ1) with MSE 2 and the lowest DEU is:
(1− (z0 − ))z0
(1− (z1 − ))z1 . (8)
The reason for the gap in defender expected utilities is that
the attacker attacks the target with value that is underesti-
mated by (zˆ0, zˆ1). This target has less coverage than it would
have if the defender knew the attacker’s utilities precisely, al-
lowing the attacker to benefit. When the defender reduces the
coverage on the larger value target, the attacker benefits more,
causing the gap in expected defender utilities.
Note that because (8) is at least one (since DEU are nega-
tive), decreasing the MSE does not necessarily lead to higher
DEU . For  > ′, the learned model at MSE=2 will have
higher DEU than the model at MSE=(′)2 if the former under-
estimates the value of z1, the latter underestimates the value
of z0 and , and ′ are sufficiently close. In decision-focused
learning, theDEU is used as the loss directly—thus, a model
with lower loss must have higher DEU .
In the case of Thm. 1, the defender can lose value z0, or 
as z0 → 1, compared to the optimum because of an unfavor-
able distribution of estimation error. We show that this carries
over to a boundedly rational QR attacker, with the degree of
loss converging towards the rational case as λ increases.
Theorem 2. Consider the setting of Thm. 1, but in the case of
a QR attacker. For any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, if λ ≥ 2(1−α) log 1(1−α) ,
the defender’s loss compared to the optimum may be as much
as α(1− ) under a target value estimate with MSE 2.
4 Decision-Focused Learning in SSGs with an
SUQR Adversary
We now present our technical approach to decision-focused
learning in SSGs. As discussed above, we use DEU(qˆ), the
expected utility induced by an estimate qˆ, as the objective for
training. The key idea is to embed the defender optimization
problem into training and compute gradients of DEU with
respect to the model’s predictions. In order to do so, we need
two quantities, each of which poses a unique challenge in the
context of SSGs.
First, we need ∂x
∗(qˆ)
∂qˆ , which describes how the defender’s
strategy x∗ depends on qˆ. Computing this requires differenti-
ating through the defender’s optimization problem. Previous
work on differentiable optimization considers convex prob-
lems [Amos and Kolter, 2017]. However, typical bounded
rationality models for qˆ (e.g., QR, SUQR, and SHARP) all
induce nonconvex defender problems. We resolve this chal-
lenge by showing how to differentiate through the local opti-
mum output by a black-box nonconvex solver.
Second, we need ∂DEU(x
∗(qˆ);q)
∂x∗(qˆ) , which describes how the
defender’s true utility with respect to q depends on her strat-
egy x∗. Computing this term requires a counterfactual es-
timate of how the attacker would react to a different cov-
erage vector than the historical one. Unfortunately, typical
datasets only contain a set of sampled attacker responses to a
particular historical defender mixed strategy. Previous work
on decision-focused learning in other domains [Donti et al.,
2017; Wilder et al., 2019] assumes that the historical data
specifies the utility of any possible decision, but this assump-
tion breaks down under the limited data available in SSGs.
We show that common models like SUQR exhibit a crucial
decomposition property that enables unbiased counterfactual
estimates. We now explain both steps in more detail.
4.1 Decision-Focused Learning for Nonconvex
Optimization
Under nonconvexity, all that we can (in general) hope for is
a local optimum. Since there may be many local optima, it
is unclear what it means to differentiate through the solution
to the problem. We assume that we have black-box access
to a nonconvex solver which outputs a fixed local optimum.
We show that we can obtain derivatives of that particular op-
timum by differentiating through a convex quadratic approx-
imation around the solver’s output (since existing techniques
apply to the quadratic approximation).
We prove that this procedure works for a wide range of
nonconvex problems. Specifically, we consider the generic
problem minx∈X f(x, θ) where f is a (potentially non-
convex) objective which depends on a learned parame-
ter θ. X is a feasible set that is representable as {x :
g1(x), . . . , gm(x) ≤ 0, h1(x), . . . , h`(x) = 0} for some
convex functions g1, . . . , gm and affine functions h1, . . . , h`.
We assume there exists some x ∈ X with g(x) < 0, where
g is the vector of constraints. In SSGs, f is the defender ob-
jective DEU , θ is the attack function qˆ, and X is the set of x
satisfying Cd. We assume that f is twice continuously differ-
entiable. These two assumptions capture smooth nonconvex
problems over a nondegenerate convex feasible set.
Suppose that we can obtain a local optimum of f . For-
mally, we say that x is a strict local minimizer of f if (1)
there exist µ ∈ Rm+ and ν ∈ R` such that ∇xf(x, θ) +
µ>∇g(x) + ν>∇h(x) = 0 and µ  g(x) = 0 and (2)
∇2f(x, θ) ≺ 0. Intuitively, the first condition is first-order
stationarity, where µ and ν are dual multipliers for the con-
straints, while the second condition says that the objective is
strictly convex at x (i.e., we have a strict local minimum, not
a plateau or saddle point). We prove the following:
Theorem 3. Let x be a strict local minimizer of f over X .
Then, except on a measure zero set, there exists a convex set I
around x such that x∗I(θ) = argminx∈I∩X f(x, θ) is differ-
entiable. The gradients of x∗I(θ) with respect to θ are given
by the gradients of solutions to the local quadratic approxi-
mation minx∈X 12x
>∇2f(x, θ)x+ x>∇f(x, θ).
This states that the local minimizer within the region output
by the nonconvex solver varies smoothly with θ, and we can
obtain gradients of it by applying existing techniques [Amos
and Kolter, 2017] to the local quadratic approximation. It is
easy to verify that the defender utility maximization problem
for an SUQR attacker satisfies the assumptions of Theorem
8 Targets
24 Targets
Figure 3: DEU − UNIF across the three strategies as we vary the number of features, number of training games and number of observed
attacks per training game. When not varied, the parameter values are 100 features, 50 training games and 5 attacks per game. DF receives
higher DEU than 2S for most parameter values.
3 since the objective is smooth and typical constraint sets for
SSGs are polytopes with nonempty interior (see [Xu, 2016]
for a list of examples). In fact, our approach is quite gen-
eral and applies to a range of behavioral models such as QR,
SUQR, and SHARP since the defender optimization problem
remains smooth in all.
4.2 Counterfactual Adversary Estimates.
We now turn to the second challenge, that of estimating
how well a different strategy would perform on the his-
torical games. We focus here on the SUQR attacker, but
the main idea extends more widely (as we discuss below).
For SUQR, if the historical attractiveness values φ(yi) were
known, then ∂DEU∂x∗ could be easily computed in closed form
using Eq. 2. The difficulty is that we typically only observe
samples from the attack distribution q, where for SUQR,
qi ∝ exp(wpi + φ(yi)). φ(yi) itself is not observed directly.
The crucial property enabling counterfactual estimates is
that the attacker’s behavior can be decomposed into his reac-
tion to the defender’s coverage (wpi) and the impact of target
values (φ(yi)). Suppose that we know w and observe sam-
pled attacks for a particular historical game. Because we can
estimate qi and the term wpi is known, we can invert the exp
function to obtain an estimate of φ(yi) (formally, this corre-
sponds to the maximum likelihood estimator under the empir-
ical attack distribution). Note that we do not know the entire
function φ, only its value at yi, and that the inversion yields
φ(yi) that is unique up to a constant additive factor. Having
recovered φ(yi), we can then perform complete counterfac-
tual reasoning for the defender on the historical games.
5 Experiments
We compare the performance of decision-focused and two-
stage approaches across a range of settings both simulated
and real (using data from Nguyen et al. [2013]). We find
that decision-focused learning outperforms two-stage when
the number of training games is low, the number of attacks
observed on each training game is low, and the number of tar-
get features is high. We compare the following three defender
strategies: Decision-focused (DF) is our decision-focused ap-
proach. For the prediction neural network, we use a single
layer with ReLU activations with 200 hidden units on syn-
thetic data and 10 hidden units on the simpler human sub-
ject data. We do not tune DF. Two-stage (2S) is a standard
two-stage approach, where a neural network is fit to predict
attacks, minimizing cross-entropy on the training data, us-
ing the same architecture as DF. We find that two-stage is
sensitive to overfitting, and thus, we use Dropout and early
stopping based on a validation set. Uniform attacker values
(UNIF) is a baseline where the defender assumes that the at-
tacker’s value for all targets is equal and maximizes DEU
under that assumption.
5.1 Experiments in Simulation
We perform experiments against an attacker with an SUQR
target attractiveness function. Raw features values are sam-
pled i.i.d. from the uniform distribution over [-10, 10]. Be-
cause it is necessary that the attacker target value function is a
function of the features, we sample the attacker and defender
target value functions by generating a random neural network
for the attacker and defender. Our other parameter settings
are chosen to align with Nguyen et al.’s [2013] human sub-
ject data. We rescale defender values to be between -10 and
0.
We choose instance parameters to illustrate the differences
in performance between decision-focused and two-stage ap-
proaches. We run 28 trials per parameter combination. Un-
less it is varied in an experiment, the parameters are:
1. Number of targets = |T | ∈ {8, 24}.
2. Features per target = |y|/|T | = 100.
3. Number of training games = |Dtrain| = 50. We fix the
number of test games = |Dtest| = 50.
4. Number of attacks per training game = |A| = 5.
5. Defender resources is the number of defense resources
available. We use 3 for 8 targets and 9 for 24.
6. We fix the attacker’s weight on defender coverage to be
w = −4 (see Eq. 2), a value chosen because of its re-
semblance to observed attacker w in human subject ex-
periments [Nguyen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014]. All
strategies receive access to this value, which would re-
quire the defender to vary her mixed strategies to learn.
Figure 4: DEU − UNIF from human subject data for 8 and 24 targets, as the number of attacks per training game is varied and number of
training games is varied. DF receives higher DEU for most settings, especially for 24-target games.
7. Historical coverage = phistorical is the coverage gener-
ated by UNIF, which is fixed for each training game.
Results (Simulations). Fig. 3 shows the results of the ex-
periments in simulation, comparing DF and 2S across a vari-
ety of problem types. DF yields higher DEU than 2S across
most tested parameter settings and DF especially excels in
problems where learning is more difficult: more features,
fewer training games and fewer attacks. The vertical axis
of each graph is median DEU minus the DEU achieved by
UNIF. Because UNIF does not perform learning, its DEU is
unaffected by the horizontal axis parameter variation, which
only affects the difficulty of the learning problem, not the dif-
ficulty of the game. The average DEU(UNIF) = −2.5 for 8
targets and DEU(UNIF) = −4.2 for 24.
The left column of Fig. 3 compares DF to 2S as the num-
ber of attacks observed per game increases. For both 8 and 24
targets, DF receives higher DEU than 2S across the tested
range. 2S fails to outperform UNIF at 2 attacks per target,
whereas DF receives 75% of the DEU it receives at 15 at-
tacks per target.
The center column of Fig. 3 compares DEU as the
number of training games increases. Note that without
training games, no learning is possible and DEU(2S) =
DEU(DF) = DEU(UNIF). DF receives equal or higher
DEU than 2S, except for 24 targets and 200 training games.
The right column of Fig. 3 compares DEU as the number
of features decreases. A larger number of features results in
a harder learning problem, as each feature increases the com-
plexity of the attacker’s value function. Of the the parameters
we vary, features has the largest impact on the relative perfor-
mance of DF and 2S. DF performs better than 2S for more
than 50 features (for 8 targets) and 100 features (for 24 tar-
gets). For more than 150 features, 2S fails to learn for both 8
and 24 targets and performs extremely poorly.
5.2 Experiments on Human Subject Data
We use data from human subject experiments performed by
Nguyen et al. [2013]. The data consists of an 8-target setting
with 3 defender resources and a 24-target setting with 9. Each
setting has 44 games. Historical coverage is the optimal cov-
erage assuming a QR attacker with λ = 1. For each game,
30-45 attacks by human subjects are recorded.
We use the attacker coverage parameter w calculated by
Nguyen et al. [2013]: −8.23. We use maximum likelihood
estimation to calculate the ground truth target values for the
test games. There are four features for each target: attacker’s
reward and defender’s penalty for a successful attack, at-
tacker’s penalty and defender’s reward for a failed attack.
Note that to be consistent with the rest of the paper, we as-
sume the defender receives a reward of 0 if she successfully
prevents an attack.
Results (Human Subject Data). We find that DF receives
higher DEU than 2S on the human subject data. Fig. 4 sum-
marizes our results as the number of training attacks per tar-
get and games are varied. Varying the number of attacks, for
8 targets, DF achieves its highest percentage improvement in
DEU at 5 attacks where it receives 28% more than 2S. For
24 targets, DF achieves its largest improvement of 66% more
DEU than 2S at 1 attack.
Varying the number of games, DF outperforms 2S except
for fewer than 10 training games in the 8-target case. The per-
centage advantage is greatest for 8-target games at 20 train-
ing games (33%) and at 2 training games for 24-target games,
where 2S barely outperforms UNIF.
The theorems of Sec. 3 suggest that models with higher
DEU may not have higher predictive accuracy. We find that,
indeed, this can occur. The effect is most pronounced in the
human subject experiments, where 2S has lower test cross
entropy than DF by 2–20%. Note that we measure test cross
entropy against the attacks generated by UNIF, the same de-
fender strategy used to generate the training data and that
2S received extensive hyperparameter to improve validation
cross entropy and DF did not.
6 Conclusion
We present a decision-focused approach to adversary model-
ing in security games. We provide a theoretical justification
as to why training an attacker model to maximize DEU can
provide higher DEU than training the model to maximize
predictive accuracy. We extend past work in decision-focused
learning to smooth nonconvex objectives, accounting for the
defender’s optimization in SSGs against many attacker types,
including SUQR. We show empirically, in both synthetic and
human subject data, that our decision-focused approach out-
performs standard two stage approaches.
We conclude that improving predictive accuracy does not
guarantee increased DEU in SSGs. We believe this conclu-
sion has important consequences for future research and that
our decision-focused approach can be extended to a variety of
SSG models where smooth nonconvex objectives and poly-
tope feasible regions are common.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We use zi to represent the attacker’s value for successfully
attacking target i.
Lemma 1. Consider a two-target, zero-sum SSG with a ra-
tional attacker, and a single defense resource, which is not
subject to scheduling contraints. The optimal defender cov-
erage is x0 = z0 and x1 = z1, and the defender’s payoff
under this coverage is −(1− z0)z0 = −(1− z1)z1.
Proof. The defender’s maximum payoff is achieved when the
expected value for attacking each target is equal, and we re-
quire that x0 + x1 ≤ 1 for feasibility. With x0 = z0 and
x1 = z1, the attacker’s payoff is (1 − z0)z0 if he attacks tar-
get 0 and (1− z1)z1 = (1− (1− z0))(1− z0) = z0(1− z0)
if he attacks target 1.
Theorem 4. Consider a two-target SSG with a rational at-
tacker, zero-sum utilities, and a single defense resource to
allocate, which is not subject to scheduling constraints (i.e.,
any nonnegative marginal coverage that sums to one is feasi-
ble). Assume the attacker observes the utilities of the attacker
and defender, which we assume w.l.o.g. are non-negative and
sum to one. The defender has an estimate of the attacker’s
utility uˆa with mean squared error (MSE) 2. Suppose the
defender optimizes her coverage against this estimate. If
2 ≤ (1 − z0)2, the ratio between the defender’s expected
utility under the worst estimate of ua with MSE 2 and that
with the best is:
(1− (z1 − ))z1
(1− (z0 − ))z0 (9)
where z0 ≥ z1 are the attacker’s values for the targets.
Proof. Given the condition that 2 ≤ (1− z0)2, there are two
configurations of zˆ that have mean squared error 2: zˆ0 =
z0±, zˆ1 = z1∓, yielding defender utility−(1−(z1−))z1
and (1−(z0−))z0, respectively, because the attacker always
attacks the target with underestimated value. The condition
on 2 is required to make both estimates feasible. Because
z0 ≥ z1, −(1− (z0 − ))z0 ≤ −(1− (z1 − ))z1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let f(p) denote the defender’s utility with coverage probabil-
ity p against a perfectly rational attacker and g(p) denote their
utility against a QR attacker. Suppose that we have a bound
g(p)− f(p) ≤ δ
for some value δ. Let p∗ be the optimal coverage prob-
ability under perfect rationality. Note that for an alternate
probability p′ > p∗
g(p′) ≤ f(p′) + δ
= f(p∗)− (p′ − p∗)+ δ
≤ g(p∗)− (p′ − p∗)+ δ
(since f(p) ≤ g(p) holds for all p) and so any p′ > p∗+ δ is
guaranteed to have g(p′) < g(p∗), implying that the defender
must have p′ ≤ p∗ + δ in the optimal QR solution.
We now turn to estimating how large λ must be in order
to get a sufficiently small δ. Let q be the probability that the
attacker chooses the first target under QR. Note that we have
f(p) = p and g(p) = (1− p)(1− )q+ p(1− q). We have
g(p)− f(p) = (1− p)(1− )q + p(1− q)− p
= [(1− p)(1− )− p]q
≤ q
For two targets with value 1 and , q is given by
eλ(1−)(1−p)
eλp + eλ(1−)(1−p)
=
1
1 + eλ[p−(1−)(1−p)]
Provided that λ ≥ 1p−(1−)(1−p) log 1δ = 1p−(1−) log 1δ ,
we will have g(p) − f(p) ≤ δ. Suppose that we would like
this bound to hold over all p ≥ 1 − α for some 0 < α < 1.
Then, p − (1 − ) ≥ (1 − α) and so λ ≥ 1(1−α) log 1δ
suffices. Now if we take δ ≤ (1 − α)2, we have that for
λ ≥ 2(1−α) log 1(1−α) , the QR optimal strategy p′ must sat-
isfy p′ ≤ 1−α, implying that the defender allocates at least
α coverage to the target with true value 0. Suppose the at-
tacker chooses the target with value 1 with probability q∗.
Then, the defender’s loss compared to the optimum is q∗α.
By a similar arugment as above, it is easy to verify that under
our stated conditions on λ, and assuming α ≥ 12 , we have
q∗ ≥ (1− ), for total defender loss (1− )α.
C Proofs for nonconvex optimization
Theorem 5. Let f be twice continuously differentiable and x
be a strict local minimizer of f over X . Then, at except on
a measure zero set, there exists a convex set I around x such
that x∗I(θ) = argminx∈I∩X f(x, θ) is differentiable. The
gradients of x∗(θ) are given by the gradients of solutions to
the local quadratic approximation minx∈X xT∇2f(x, θ)x+
∇f(x, θ).
Proof. By continuity, there exists an open ball around x on
which ∇2f(x, θ) is negative definite; let I be this ball. Re-
stricted to X ∩ I, the optimization problem is convex, and
satisfies Slater’s condition by our assumption on X combined
with Lemma 2. Therefore, the KKT conditions are a nec-
essary and sufficient description of x∗I(θ). Since the KKT
conditions depend only on second-order information, x∗I(θ)
is differentiable whenever the quadratic approximation is dif-
ferentiable. Note that in the quadratic approximation, we can
drop the requirement that x ∈ I since the minmizer over
x ∈ X already lies in I by continuity. Using Theorem 1
of Amos and Kolter (2017), the quadratic approximation is
differentiable except at a measure zero set, proving the theo-
rem.
Lemma 2. Let g1...gm be convex functions and consider the
set X = {x : g(x) ≤ 0}. If there is a point x∗ which satisfies
g(x) < 0, then for any point x′ ∈ X , the setX∩B(x′, δ) con-
tains a point xint satisfying g(x) < xint and d(xint, x′) < δ.
Proof. By convexity, for any t ∈ [0, 1], the point (1− t)x∗ +
tx′ lies in X , and for t < 1, satisfies g((1− t)x∗ + tx′) < 0.
Moreoever, for t sufficiently large (but strictly less than 1), we
must have d((1 − t)x∗ + tx′, x′) < δ, proving the existence
of xint.
